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SYMPOSIUM

COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
JonathanH. Adler t & Andrew P. Morriss
Many factors led to the growth of environmental regulation in the
1960s and 1970s, including the perceived failure of preexisting
institutions to provide adequate levels of environmental protection.'
In the decades following World War II, state governments began
enacting broad regulatory schemes to control the environmental
effects of private industrial activity. The federal government followed
soon thereafter, erecting the basic architecture of contemporary
federal environmental law. Beginning in 1969, Congress enacted a
the National4
flurry of environmental statutes, including
3
2
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
t Professor of Law & Director, Center for Business Law & Regualtion, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
H. Ross & Helen Workman Professor of Law and Professor of Business; Professor,
Institute for Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and
Senior Associate, Property & Environment Research Center, Bozeman, Montana.
I For one account of the growth of federal environmental regulation, see Jonathan H.
Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in
EnvironmentalProtection,55 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f(2000). The first federal air pollution legislation was actually
enacted in 1955 (Pub. L. No. 80-159), and amended in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1967. With a few
exceptions, however, such as the creation of federal emission standards for new automobiles
mandated in 1967, the pre-1970 statutes were largely non-regulatory in nature. As a
consequence, the 1970 Act is commonly referred to as the "Clean Air Act."
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1385 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
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the Endangered Species Act,5 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act,6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,7 the
Safe Drinking Water Act, 8 and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 9
Commentators regularly cite the failure of common law institutions to
protect environmental values as a reason for the adoption of
prescriptive environmental measures during this period.' 0 It was well
understood that "the traditional common law remedies were utterly
inadequate to deal with contemporary environmental problems."" As
a leading environmental law casebook explains, environmental
legislation was, in part, driven by "dissatisfaction" with the common
law's capacity
to address "modem concerns about environmental
12
quality."
Today there is widespread dissatisfaction with many aspects of
federal environmental law.1 3 The apparent success of early
environmental regulations notwithstanding, many analysts and
academics have begun to reexamine the potential of common law
causes of action to supplement, if not supplant, portions of the
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
7 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k (2000).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2000).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (2000).
10See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality; Part!: State Pollution ControlPrograms,52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 195 (1966) (noting the
inadequacy of private legal remedies to control water pollution); Frank B. Cross, Common Law
Conceits: A Comment on Meiners & Yandle, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965, 977 (1999) ("the
common law era saw some of the most dramatic pollution episodes."); Robert V. Percival,
EnvironmentalLegislationand the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
9, (1998) (tracing history of major environmental statutes to national media attention that made
a particular market failure appear politically important). See also James L. Huffman, The Past
and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23 (2000) (tracing history of environmental
law as a discipline).
6

1

Joseph L. Sax, Introduction, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING

THE ENVIRONMENT xvii (Clifford Rechtstaffen & Denise Antolini eds. 2007). See also,
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 114 (2004) ("Traditional tort
doctrine proved unable to provide meaningful redress to the new class of environmental
injuries.").
12 ROBERT PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY

1018 (2d ed. 1996).
13 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) ("the system has grown to the point where
it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to
achieve environmental goals");

J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING

POLLUTION 2 (1997) ("For all its accomplishments, we conclude the pollution control regulatory
system is deeply and fundamentally flawed."); Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Only Path to a Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10148, 10148 (1999)
("The current system... is inadequate for the challenges ahead."); Debra S. Knopman & Marc
K. Landy, A New Model of Governance, BLUEPRINT, Fall 2000 (environmental regulations "are
increasingly inefficient in a fast-paced economy and too rigid" to address current ecological
concerns).
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existing regulatory regime. 14 Some environmental advocates have
come to the conclusion that state-based tort law may be more
protective than federal regulations. 15 At the same time, private
litigators and state attorneys general are reviving common law causes
of action in an effort to augment existing regulatory controls. 16
One group seeking a reexamination of the common law's
environmental potential is supporters of property and market-based17
approaches to environmental problems (including the two of us).
Such so-called "free market environmentalists" have argued since the
1990's that the common law provides an important source of
environmental protection capable of solving many environmental
problems through the protection of private property rights.' 8 Some
14

See

generally CREATIVE

COMMON

LAW

STRATEGIES

FOR

PROTECTING

THE

ENVIRONMENT (Clifford Rechtstaffen & Denise Antolini eds. 2007).
IsSee, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1556 (2007) ("The common law system's
independence and private incentives to challenge the status quo are particularly valuable
antidotes to complacency and ineffective regulation."); Jason J. Czamezki & Mark L. Thomsen,
Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL AFT. L. REV. 1, 35
(2007) ("State common law doctrines can effectively determine what is an unreasonable act
using state promulgated environmental standards, and provide for alternative or additional
remedies. Meanwhile, judicially crafted remedies like the common law fund-allowing portions
of state court damages to be paid to a restoration fund-can effectively promote both restoration
and deterrence where federal action has proven less than effective."); Tom Kuhnle, Note, The
Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STANF.
ENVTL. L. J. 187, 229 (1986) (concluding "common law actions currently stand as an alternative
to the arbitrary rules, delays, and poor drafting accompanying CERCLA.") On the other hand,
some have seen a "neoconservative effort to rewrite the common law of property to cripple
government's ability to control rapacious land development, protect the environment, and rein
in unethical corporations." Michael L. Rustad, Book Review, 40 TRIAL 74 (2004) (reviewing
JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE
COMMON LAW (Penguin Books 2005) (2004)).
16 See, e.g., Sax, supra note 11,at xix (observing "committed and creative lawyers ...
have reengineered the old causes of action to make them potent new tools for dealing with some
of the gravest and most persistent environmental problems we face.").
17 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing
Perceptions of Property Rights & Environmental Protection, 1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 987
(2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Free and Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection,24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2001); Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
EnvironmentalProtection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001); ECOLOGY, LIBERTY &
PROPERTY: A FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL READER (Jonathan H. Adler ed. 2000); Andrew
P. Morriss, Real People, Real Resources, & Real Choices: The Case for Market Valuation of
Water, 38 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 973 (2006); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Market
Principlesfor Pesticides, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLICY REV. 35 (2003); Andrew P.
Morriss, Terry L. Anderson, & Bruce Yandle, Principlesfor Water, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L. J.
335 (2002).
18The canonical references on common law and the environment are Todd J. Zywicki, A
Unanimity-ReinforcingModel of Efficiency in the Common Law: An InstitutionalComparison
of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 961 (1996); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES (1997); Roger Meiners &

Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE 99 (1998); Roger Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern EnvironmentalPolicy, 7 GEO. MASON
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suggest common law approaches could even be superior in many
respects to statutory schemes like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, or Comprehensive Emergency Response, Cleanup and Liability
Act, aka "Superfund."' 19 Even before that, classical liberal writers and
law and economics writers often made the case that the common law
in general was superior to statutory law in many respects.2 °
This revival of interest in the common law among free market
environmentalists prompted some more sophisticated arguments that
the common law is inadequate to deal with modem environmental
problems from some authors. 2' Others suggest that recognition of the
common law's strengths could reinvigorate or enhance existing
environmental controls.22 Few, however, have suggested that common
law measures could replace the current reliance upon administrative
regulation. Indeed, most environmental law scholarship continues to
assume that "the foreseeable future holds the administrative
state in
23
place," and a return to the common law is unlikely.
Is the common law a viable means of addressing environmental
problems? The first wave of environmental common law scholarship,

L. REV. 923 (1999); THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE
STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss,

eds. 2000); Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?,
41 WASHBURN L. J. 515 (2002). See also TERRY L. ANDERSON AND DONALD R. LEAL, FREEMARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 138 (Rev. Ed.2001) (advocating common law protections as a

"property rights approach to pollution).
19 See, e.g., Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997) (arguing CERCLA was a

step backward for environmental protection and waste site cleanup).
20 The classical liberal case for the common law was made in BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM
AND THE LAW (3rd ed. 1991); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960),

and FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER
(1978). The law and economics literature on the efficiency of the common law is vast, but traces
most of its arguments to RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973) and
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). See also Paul
H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 383 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley, eds. 2005)
(summarizing literature).
21 See, e.g., Peter S. Mcneil, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing
Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991); Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A
Comment on Meiners & Yandle, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965 (1999) (arguing that the common
law is flawed in addressing environmental problems due to capture issues); Christopher H.
Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot
Duplicate,41 WASHBURN L. J. 583 (2002); Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market
Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY
L. J. 1329 (1996).
22David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in
THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR

MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, eds. 2000).
23 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the AdministrativeState, 91 GEO. L. J. 757, 830 (2003).
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together with the law and economics and classical liberal literatures,
at least put the issue on the table for discussion. The response from
the critics raised some important criticisms, ones that needed to be
answered. Whatever the failings of the environmental regulatory
state, the common law has failings of its own, including the failure to
protect many ecological resources in the period before the enactment
of federal environmental law. In some instances administrative
regulation may have hampered or "sabotaged" common law
protections, but in others the common law failed on its own. 24
With the generous support of the Roe Foundation for the Property
and Environment Research Center, we sought to expand the literature
beyond the first round of discussion and to prompt a serious look at
the common law's potential, and potential weaknesses, in addressing
environmental problems. We wanted to know where the case for the
common law stood. The result is the set of articles and comments by
the impressive group of authors included in this symposium.
The stage is set by Professor Steven Eagle's The Common Law
and the Environment, with an analysis centered on the role of
property law within the common law. Eagle points to the incremental
nature of the common law and to its location of decisions close to the
dispute as crucial reasons to believe that the common law can escape
from the special interest traps that bedevil statutory law and
administration regulations. Eagle provides the foundation upon which
the case for the common law must rest.
Next, Stuart Buck asks how the common law has fared in the
courts in addressing actual environmental problems in The Common
Law & The Environment in the Courts. After a brief survey of the
common law causes of action available, Buck finds that assessments
of the common law's record are hampered by a lack of agreement on
what a "good" outcome is. One might argue that the common law
"works" when it produces the most environmental protection
possible. But such a definition fails the test of reasonableness, since
marginal benefits and costs matter. And even if we had a common
definition of success, Buck notes that there is little data against which
to test any hypotheses about the common law. Without either a solid
yardstick or data, Buck argues that we have to fall back on
assessments of particular situations where the institutional strengths
and weaknesses of the common law can give us some confidence that
24 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 119-26 (2002) (discussing how
state environmental regulations preempted public nuisance actions against local water pollution
and how private nuisance actions were impotent against the widespread industrial pollution of
the Cuyahoga River).
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we can say something meaningful about the type of outcomes we
might expect from common law suits.
Professor Bruce Yandle, an economist-and one of the first to
argue for a primary role for the common law-finds much to agree
with in Buck's analysis of the gaps in our knowledge about how well
the common law (or statutory law) works. But Yandle insists we can
go further than Buck's ultimate agnosticism on the common law's
merits. If we dig into the incentive structures of common law and
statutory law, Yandle suggests, we will find reason to prefer the
former to the latter.
Professor Denise Antolini has a less favorable view of Buck's
analysis, suggesting Buck is focused on the wrong questions. Antolini
critiques Buck's focus on whether common law remedies could
provide a substitute for administrative regulation. The more
appropriate questions, according to Antolini, are how and when
common law remedies can complement or supplement existing
environmental regulations. In particular, she faults Buck for ignoring
the "interstitial and catalytic" character of contemporary common law
litigation, which leads him to underestimate the common law's value
in environmental protection.
Professor Keith Hylton applies law and economics analysis to the
problems of nuisance law and proposes a modification of traditional
nuisance law to improve the common law's ability to address
environmental problems in The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law
and Implications for Environmental Regulation. Nuisance law has
been cited both in support of the common law's role 25 and as an
example of a doctrine whose time has passed.26 Hylton builds a new
analysis of nuisance law from the insights of law and economics on
agency costs, activity levels, and the level of care. Hylton argues that
nuisance law has the potential to do a better job than a statutory
alternative in some cases.
Professor Henry Butler adopts what one might call an "Austrian"
perspective 27 on the virtues of common law environmental protection
25 See, e.g., Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy,, supra note
18, at 926-935 (making the case for nuisance law's role).
26 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(Kennedy, J. concurring) (arguing that the "common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for
the exercise of a regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.").
27 "Austrian" in that Professor Butler's analysis emphasis the role of the common law as a
discovery mechanism that generates useful information about the nature and extent of
environmental problems and subjective preferences with regard to environmental values. See,
for example, the work of noted "Austrian" economist F. A. Hayek on the role of information in
a market economy. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REv. 519
(1945).

2008]

INTRODUCTION

in A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The Discovery of
Better Environmental Policy. Whereas other advocates of common
law measures may stress their efficiency or particularity, Butler
stresses the role of the common law as a discovery process. Butler
suggests that the common law, when combined with competitive
federalism, allows for the evolution of superior institutions for
environmental protection over time. Although many common law
causes of action remain intact, Butler suggests this evolution is
hampered by the mere existence of an over-arching environmental
regulatory system.
Professor J.B. Ruhl offers an alternative argument for nuisance's
relevance to contemporary environmental issues in Making Nuisance
Ecological. He argues that nuisance law is well suited to address
situations where one landowner uses her land to deprive another of
the valuable services provided by a healthy ecosystem. Ruhl argues
that the adaptability of the common law makes it ideal for bringing
new knowledge into the legal analysis of environmental issues.
Professor John Copeland Nagle examines Ruhl's analysis through
the history of nuisance law's treatment of wetlands. Noting that
nuisance law first categorized wetlands as nuisances themselves,
Nagle is less optimistic than Ruhl that a transformation of nuisance
law into a protector of ecosystems has already occurred. Nonetheless,
he is hopeful that nuisance law's flexibility can lead to better
outcomes as it incorporates new ideas about ecosystems within the
doctrine's parameters.
Professor James Huffman takes a less sanguine view of Ruhl's
effort to expand common law remedies and its potential effect on
private property rights. To Huffman, the recent environmentalist
embrace of the common law generally, and public nuisance law in
particular, poses a threat to the constitutional protection of property
rights and will unsettle the once-settled expectations that more
traditional applications of the common law sought to protect. As a
consequence, Huffman suggests, such approaches to common law
environmentalism threaten to undermine the ability of common law
institutions to allocate scarce resources in an efficient and
environmentally protective manner.
To assess where the case for the common law stands, we invited
Professor David Schoenbrod to synthesize the lessons learned from
this symposium. Schoenbrod's career has spanned the roles of
litigator for an environmental group and professor/commentator on
the law's developments. 28 In 2000, Schoenbrod wrote a chapter in a
28

See generally, DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON
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book one of us edited, making a qualified case-an agnostic's casefor the common law 29 and which prompted our selection of him as our
concluding author. Schoenbrod remains an agnostic, but his reflection
here points in the direction of greater particularity as a virtue for
solutions to environmental problems generally. Given that the
common law's strength is particularity, it seems to us that the case for
the common law is a bit stronger today than it was in 2000.
Is the common law the solution to all environmental problems? Of
course not-no more than the Clean Air Act is the solution to air
pollution or the Endangered Species Act is the one best way to protect
endangered species. Is the common law a solution worth looking at as
we wrestle with a wide range of environmental issues? We think the
papers in this symposium advance the argument that the common law
offers a serious option, whether alone or in combination with other
measures, for addressing important environmental concerns. The arc
of the story of the common law's role is not simply from ineffective
institution to historical relic supplanted by statute. Rather, there is
potential for the common law, and the underlying institution of
private property rights, to play a greater role in mediating the
conflicts over resource use that are at the heart of environmental law.
There is greater appreciation today for the institutional strengths of
the common law, both among proponents of markets and,
increasingly, among some more skeptical of market solutions. This
appreciation is not uncritical, however, and the case for the common
law remains to be articulated in particular instances based on the
different facts and institutions at play with respect to different
problems.

(2005) (discussing his career in environmental policy).
29 David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in
THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY

MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, eds. 2000).
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